

- 452 credit system of which he is at best only dimly aware. The purchaser takes much less risk, since he pays less than the standing crops are worth and, should there be a poor harvest, could at least break even.
- 433 The Mapuche are finding it increasingly difficult to produce enough crops on their small holdings to maintain themselves. The situation is serious enough for thousands of Mapuche to have abandoned reservation life entirely and sought their living elsewhere. Private ownership of land (through *división*) and individual initiative have not generally been successful adaptations to this condition, since in areas where there is good farmland more efficient Chilean farmers have usually managed to buy out Mapuche freeholders once they were no longer protected by reservation law. For those remaining on the reservation, tight credit and scarce capital aggravate their difficulties. The reservation Mapuche have attempted to solve their agrarian problem in three major ways. One, to which we will turn immediately, is renting of land to outsiders. Another is offering the use of land to tenant farmers. The third is the half-share system, whereby the Mapuche provides land and (usually) a Chilean provides labor and capital to exploit it.

ECONOMIC TRENDS: LAND RENTAL, TENANT FARMING, AND SHARECROPPING

427 Land Rental

- 427 Land may be rented on a contractual basis, the arrangements being legalized before the *jueces de Indios*. Rental occurs rather infrequently. It is uncommon for one Mapuche to rent land to another; rentals are by and large to Chileans. However, the Mapuche are highly suspicious of Chileans living on the reservation or controlling land there on a contractual basis because a negotiation of this sort tends to perpetuate itself. The Indian court apparently regards with favor Chilean farmers who have contracted to cultivate reservation land, and it is difficult to eject them. Chileans who have *ocupante* status sometimes acquired their hold on a parcel of reservation land on a contract basis, the arrangements of which were perpetuated until the individual's claim became of sufficient *de facto* strength that the legal recognition of *ocupante* was attained.

Rentals tend to be made by absentees, although Mapuche who hold many hectares also resort to this practice. The absentee is often if not usually interested in having the reservation undergo *división* so that

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he may sell his land for a lump sum, and is generally indifferent to whatever effects his renting the land to a Chilean might have on the reservation community. It could mean that the Chilean renter might obtain *ocupante* status and receive a parcel of reservation land when and if the land is divided into severalty holdings. In effect, this deprives Mapuche residents of a share of land that would have been apportioned among them. A situation of this sort occurred on reservation Nahuelpan at the time of *división* in 1949 and a similar case has already transpired on Llancaman, which continues to have full reservation status. Many examples of this sort are contained in the archives of the Ministry of Lands and Colonization.

In many cases, renting land to a Chilean amounts to a complete surrender of one's cultural integrity and agrarian status. For this reason it occurs most frequently with Mapuche who have already left the reservation. It is not a favored solution for increasing income among reservation Indians both because of this "surrender" and because of the real danger of the eventual loss of all or part of one's land. [156]

Tenant Farming

The practice of admitting Chileans to the reservations as tenant farmers or *inquilinos* also has its risks but, perhaps owing to Chilean conceptions of landlord and tenant relationships, the Mapuche "landlord" is usually regarded as having the higher status, the upper hand. As with rental arrangements, tenant and landlord legalize their transaction on a one-year contract basis before the *Juez de Indios*. [554] [692]

The tenant differs from the renter, usually, in that he is a poor peasant who operates his single holding. A renter tends to have land in several places, and perhaps is a *fundo* owner himself. It is clear that renters usually are relatively high-status Chileans who often carry political weight in respect, at least, to the Mapuche with whom they are dealing. The tenant's dependent position in the theoretical framework of landlord-tenant relationships operates to the Mapuche landholder's advantage if he should have to resort to legal action to remove his tenant from the land. [691]

Mapuche "landlords" fall roughly into two economic categories: those who are relatively well-to-do and those who are not. The well-to-do landlord might admit a tenant for the prestige it will give him in the community. He surely expects to profit from the labor of the tenant, who works a specified part of the landlord's fields for a percentage of the harvest. The tenant frequently provides plowing [427] [556]

vation, while males tend to remain together for their entire life. If a woman continues to reside with her natal group, or returns to it in later life, her position is somewhat anomalous and is difficult to describe in institutional terms. Essentially, this is because women are *expected* to marry out of their natal group and only enjoy full community membership among the kin of their spouse. 613
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[591]

Since women usually marry at an early age they do not play an important adult role in the affairs of their natal group; even if they marry late, remaining for part of their majority among patrilineal kinsmen, they rarely enjoy the full adult status accorded to in-married women of the local group. Once having married off their natal reservation, the intensity of the relationship with their natal group diminishes over time, especially if they should move to a "distant" reservation. Nevertheless, they comprise an important link between their patrilineage and that of their husband. They are the "father's sisters" who link preferential groups in the matrilineal marriage system. [582]

In the case of women, much more than men, marriage and full membership in a residential kingroup are closely complementary statuses, and it is membership in one's husband's residential group that is of greatest significance throughout adult life. However, if a woman never marries, or if she becomes widowed, separated, or divorced, and returns to her natal group, her status usually depends on her relationship with her closest male kinsman and the manner in which she manipulates kinship ties, especially in the economic sphere. 613
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Since the institution of the present reservation policy, however, women have exercised greater claims to usufructuary rights over land. This has come about because women as well as men were registered during the original survey and census taking at the time of the granting of the *titulo de merced*. Original *radicadas* (females registered at the time the reservation was established) may claim land, should they return to their natal reservation and need it for the support of themselves and their family. Their claims are honored by the Mapuche as well as by the *Juzgado de Indios* (Indian court), but this is not a cut-and-dried recognition. For example, if agricultural land is scarce, the members of a woman's natal group might discourage her return, and, should she take her claim before the *Juzgado de Indios*, the court might decide against her if in fact there is a real shortage of land on her natal reservation. Therefore, while the fact of *radicación* (original registration) is a recognized mechanism for the 562
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a conservative *indigenista* organization which has representatives in the national government. His influence on the reservation, however, is less than in the extrareservational sphere. [613
[622]
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The other living branch of Alonso's sublineage is greatly depleted. Three of Juan's sons live off the reservation and it is unlikely that they will return. Of the two resident brothers, one (Y) recently married and fathered a son. He is making plans, however, to move to another reservation where he has a claim on five hectares of farmland held by his paternal half brother. This will leave his older brother, who is not married, his aged mother, his sister, and an adopted child on the reservation. A half brother, Martín, has lived in a nearby town for many years, but keeps in close touch with reservation life. He is an influential member of an indigenous political party which is in opposition to that to which José (X) belongs. This breach has served to implement the hostility existing between the two branches of the sublineage because of a dispute over inheritance. While the eminence of Martín and José in extrareservational affairs makes this an atypical situation, it nevertheless indicates how factionalism can cut across even the closest kinship ties. There is no longer any economic cooperation between the two branches of the sublineage, a condition which has arisen only in the last ten years. The members of the respective branches do not even speak, except to hurl epithets and curses at one another on occasion. There are charges and countercharges of theft and sorcery, and on one occasion the police were called in to settle a dispute arising over the inheritance of land and farm machinery. [665]
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In prereservation days such a situation would have been insupportable in a small residential group, and seems to have been most often resolved by one party moving away and losing touch with the natal group. Today, and over the past few generations, a different adjustment must be made. In the early days of the reservation period, the chief would have been able to quash open hostility of this sort, since his position at that time was considerably more authoritative than now. One method was banishment. At that time, before sublineation had become significant for the local group, banishment would have amounted to dismissing a troublesome individual and his wife and children, rather than an entire sublineage consisting of several families and all those additional families which had sided with them. Today's situation is differently structured. Sublineation has in some sense weakened the authority of the chief and the integration of the [178
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The Reservation as a Political Unit

[62] In this chapter I propose only a partial consideration of Mapuche
[48] political organization, partial in the sense that the reservation is
taken as a political entity vis-à-vis the Chilean government in the
context of colonialism and the reservation system. The political issue
of greatest importance is the status of Mapuche society. This centers
around the "question" of reservation land.¹

[62] We have seen that chieftainship implies political as distinguished
from purely kinship organization and that it hinges on the reserva-
tion system per se. In its body of Indian legislation, the Chilean
government deals with Mapuche reservations as a totality. However,
in actual practice at the local level of administration, the segmentary
nature of Mapuche political units compels government agencies to
deal with single reservations and individual chiefs in matters pertain-
ing to reservation land. In this sense, each reservation is an au-
tonomous political unit with respect to other reservations.

[69] Reservation status entitles the Mapuche to special consideration
in Indian courts and in the Ministry of Lands and Colonization. As

[62] 'I am arbitrarily excluding a detailed treatment of the ritual attributes of
[128] political leadership, as exemplified in the office of priest-chief (*killatuse*), under-
[185] standable only through a discussion of religious morality and its ritual expression.
Mapuche morality is an important integrative force of sufficiently complex struc-
ture to justify its analysis in a separate monograph, and, for the most part, in the
subcolonial context in which it thrives.

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Chilean citizens, though, the Mapuche also have a series of rights and obligations irrespective of reservation status which brings them under the jurisdiction of national courts, the authority of which is backed by the Chilean police force, military organization, and penal institutions. Nevertheless, the question of land rights (corporate *vs.* severalty status) is central to Mapuche political organization. It is largely as title holder of reservation land that the chief enjoys political leadership. It is membership in a reservation community that conditions the individual's political interests and goals. The eventual disposition of reservation land continues to be the primary issue around which Mapuche-Chilean relationships center in the political sphere of social action. The preamble to the contemporary condition may be stated in historical terms.

For more than 300 years after the Spanish invasion of Chile the Mapuche maintained considerable autonomy over the region south of the Bío Bío River. Horacio Lara (1889:241) expressed himself on this matter in the following words: "La Araucanía seguía prestandose a la faz del mundo como una sección territorial independiente de nuestra República, con sus costumbres y su independencia propia. . . ." But toward the end of the colonial era a series of forts and towns was re-established south of the Bío Bío — Los Angeles, Nacimiento, Antuco, and Santa Barbara were founded between 1742 and 1758. South of the Mapuche stronghold, Osorno, San Pablo, and Río Bueno were established with the effect of delimiting the southern extension of Mapuche-held territory. These towns did not serve as jumping-off points for immediate settler penetration of the Indian zone, however.

While little is really known about the details of Mapuche politico-military organization during most of this long era, the fact that they were able to resist white settlement of their heartland suggests an organization that could be called into play when the occasion demanded. It must not be overlooked, though, that they had the advantage of sheer weight of numbers, which, perhaps more than tactical maneuvers and organizational ability, accounts for their successful resistance. Also, because of a lack of centralized political authority, the Spaniards and later the Chileans were forced to conquer one small residential aggregate after another, the defeat of one such group not entailing the submission of the rest. In any case, the long-range successes of the Mapuche were always at the expense of

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Decisions regarding peacetime affairs and warlike undertakings were usually made in conferences of the responsible men and subheads at the house or meeting-ground of the head or "chief" after free expression of views and by common agreement. There was a certain loose hierarchy of honor and status (rather than authority proper) embracing higher and lower heads and "chiefs" — which brings us to the less clear features of the . . . socio-political structure [725]. 642 [60]

In the course of time, particularly after the beginning of the 19th century, a certain increase in the executive and judicial power and authority accrued to peacetime headmen . . . and the earlier atomistic peacetime political structure assumed somewhat greater unity, cohesion, and hierarchization. But the basic democratic forms and functions persisted largely intact [726]. 622

In writing of law and legal procedure, Cooper has this to say: 68 673

The chief crimes recognized were adultery and wife-stealing, murder, theft, homicidal sorcery, and treason. The offended party and his kin dealt with the offender; in earlier times headmen and other caciques had little or no authority to try cases or to pronounce judgment. Adultery, murder, and sorcery were punishable by death, and sometimes were actually so punished; but more commonly, in cases of adultery and murder, composition was resorted to, with payment of strings of llankas . . . [726]. 627 [622]

Today, certain behavior is defined as extralegal by Chilean standards, serious departures from national law being handled by Chilean institutions empowered to enforce law and order. The Mapuche go to law for the settlement of disputes involving certain crimes and torts, but within the reservation community traditional sanctions deal effectively with other antisocial acts of a different nature. Most important among these are the ones which involve sorcery and which the Chilean courts usually refuse to consider seriously. Ostracism, ridicule, and the threat of sorcery continue as sanctions on most if not all reservations and larger communities. In certain instances, therefore, the Mapuche "take the law into their own hands," applying traditional moral principles in the ordering of social action. But matters involving property and personal-rights not capable of being dealt with by traditional means are ultimately resolvable by recourse to the Chilean system of courts and law-enforcement agencies. 692 [48] 683 [683] 681 [681] 448 [448]

MAPUCHE: "PEOPLE OF THE LAND"

After the declaration of Chilean independence in 1810, the new national government assumed responsibility for colonizing the Mapuche stronghold south of the Bío Bío River. In general, the republican government's efforts followed the pattern established during the 195 648 423

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105 reservation community is needed before application for *division* may
648 be made. The government's intentions and hopes seem not to have
423 changed, however. This is reflected quite graphically by the fact that
a census of Mapuche lands is broken down into "reservations di-
vided" and "reservations to be divided," the latter category including
all communities now having reservation status.

177 The reservation policy, involving as it does the entire problem of
648 the disposition of Mapuche lands, is the main area in which Chilean
692 and Indian politico-legal structures overlap. National-level politics
and laws have had tremendous influence on reservation political
[671] structure and legal concepts. *Admapu* (customary law) has been
brought into closer approximation with the Chilean system, and the
latter has made concessions to Mapuche juridical and social beliefs
and practices.

648 Before proceeding with a discussion of Mapuche law and political
organization, which cannot be divorced from the Chilean politico-
juridical system, it might be well to outline briefly the Chilean gov-
ernmental structure. In the first place, Chile is a republic with a
National Congress, composed of a Senate and a House of Deputies,
a system of courts, and a military and police organization. The nation
is divided into numerous Provinces which are subdivided into De-
partments, Subdelegations, and Districts, each with its elected or
appointed head and administrative body. An *Intendente* heads each
Province, a Governor each Department, a Subdelegate each Subdele-
gation, and an Inspector each District. Mapuche are Chilean nationals
and, upon proof of literacy, attain with maturity the right to vote
[641] and to be elected or appointed to any of the nation's political offices.
[664] In 1953 there were two Mapuche *Diputados*, several Inspectors, a
number of *regidores*, and at least one *alcalde* in Cautín Province. The
then Minister of Lands and Colonization was born and spent his early
years on a reservation.

Deputies are elected from one or more Departments, depending
on population, there being a proportion of one deputy to each 30-
000 inhabitants. In the indigenous zone, especially in Cautín Province
[162] with its estimated 100,000 or more reservation-dwelling Indians, the
Mapuche are able to swing local elections, even where they are not
actually in the majority, due to the existence of numerous splinter
parties. They are becoming more conscious of regional-national pol-
[664] itics and are forming vocal pressure groups, literally Indian parties,
[665] through which they express themselves on the national scene.

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The Ministry of Lands and Colonization has jurisdiction over Indian affairs. Special courts and judges hear land claims and other cases involving reservations, but violations of civil law are heard in regular Chilean courts open to whites and Indians alike. Specifically, the Indian judges (*Jueces de Indios*) handle *división*. In appearing before the Indian courts (*Juzgados de Indios*) the Mapuche is entitled to legal representation (*abogado procurador*). In all, the government administers an indigenous zone almost the size of the state of Delaware. [131]

Nevertheless, this represents a territory vastly reduced over the course of the last hundred years. Immediately after the rebellion of 1880-82 Mapuche society seems to have been in a state of turmoil. It is estimated that many thousands of Indians migrated across the Andes at this time to escape military reprisal or because they had been routed out of their former settlements at points of white penetration. [175, 648, 131, 167]

Within Araucanía there was also tremendous population movement as groups shifted en masse to the Andean foothills or southward to and across the Toltén River. The greatest pressures were brought to bear on the Mapuche from the north and west. Forested, virgin territory was opened up during this period as much by the Mapuche themselves as by the white colonists. Aside from the general historical accounts there are other data which add to the impression of great population mobility between 1880 and the first two decades of the twentieth century. In the *título* records, for example, it is not uncommon to read that witnesses for the applicant chief knew him and his *familia* for only as little as fifteen or twenty years in some instances, indicating a short occupancy in the area. Mobility is given tacit recognition in the reservation legislation, as well, for it is stated (e.g. *Ley No. 4,111*, June 1931, Art. 27) that an Indian will be considered a legal resident only on the reservation in which he earns his livelihood, regardless of the fact that he might be mentioned in various *títulos*. [175, 648, 166, 621]

In large parts of Araucanía the registration and mapping of reservations was proceeding slowly, and, as towns sprang up and farm colonies developed, the Mapuche continued to withdraw. With the establishment of railroads and roadways throughout the frontier, the Indians were put off their land with little or no compensation. Some reservations were not mapped and registered under a chief until as recently as the second decade of the twentieth century — almost thirty years after the end of hostilities. During this interim, the social [423, 175, 648, 423, 621]

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wealth of the community. Stressful situations within the community were no longer resolved simply by one segment moving away to establish a household beyond the authority of the local leader. One may move out from the paternal roof and set up a new household within reservation limits, provided there is available land. But one does not leave the reservation, unless it is decided to relinquish land rights and, indeed, give up the Mapuche way of life. [198
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Even in setting up a new household within the reservation, individuals were required to seek permission of the chief, and in a certain measure this is so today. However, since most reservation land is already claimed through usufruct it usually remains for an arrangement to be made within a family group (often a minimal lineage) in regard to whether or not some fields will be made available to one of the members who might want to establish a household of his own. The important thing is the total-group aspect of reservation life. Adjustments may be worked out between or within families on an *ad hoc* basis, but it is the friction between the larger segments of the population, rather than intrafamilial disputes, that is no longer resolvable by emigration. [592]
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The extension of the chief's control over a sedentary population is a result of scarce land and the reservation system. The chief receives the support of those individuals most dependent upon him and generally has the allegiance of his entire patrilineage. His authority is sanctioned, on the one hand, by the Chilean government, to the extent that it does not conflict with Chilean law, but on the other hand it is weakened by the government's more recent policy of dealing directly with individual Mapuche rather than through the agency of their chief. This is so especially in matters of crimes and torts, since the development of a larger and more efficient police force in the indigenous zone and a more sophisticated attitude on the part of the Mapuche themselves about going to court. [198
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Chieftainship also is weakened when the original title holder dies. If the successor to leadership is a man who is ritually adept and personally liked he will continue to hold sway over the reservation group, but in the absence of these qualities and if the population is composed of several kingroups, especially if these have increased in membership, his task is difficult. This must be related to the land problem, however, to be understood. Under Chilean law, there is really no legal heir to the *título de merced*. When the original title holder dies, no change is made by registering the land in the name of his heir. Rather,

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the Chileans and the Mapuche were for a long time deterrents to the loss of the chief's authority over his reservation group. To a certain extent this may be said to be operative still in times of crisis.

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In parts of Araucanía where there is less pressure on land and where *división* is not a subject which is hotly contended among the reservation population, chieftainship is noticeably stronger in the economic sphere. Communal labor is more frequent and carried out on a larger scale. Communal land is used for grazing and gathering wood and is still under the jurisdiction of the chief. If an individual wishes to clear communal woodland for the purpose of farming it, permission has to be granted. In these matters there is an informal conclave of elders who make the decisions, but the chief is their spokesman and the official arbiter. The individual resident has a recognized right to continue his petition in the hope of swaying the leader's opinions by showing cause.

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Significant modifications have taken place in Mapuche social structure since the imposition of a Chilean administrative system. Reservation social structure is qualitatively different from that of pre-reservation times. Before the period of peaceful reservation living, sociopolitical units fluctuated or changed in size. Since the imposition of reservation restrictions a greater population stability has come about, communities made up of unrelated kingroups have evolved, and reservation leadership has acquired political aspects over and above kinship allegiance.

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Stated differently, the characteristic prerreservation social unit was a kinship rather than a political group. For the most part it was a small, autonomous domestic unit. In establishing reservations the Chilean government attempted to follow this traditional social alignment. We have seen, however, that reservations were composed of dominant kingroups and one or more remnant groups of nonrelatives. This situation really approximated the Mapuche wartime organization, rather than the normally highly segmentary structure characterized by weak leadership in the hands of a *lonko*. So today's reservations continue to comprise a congeries of small communities which, in the framework of colonial administration, are essentially autonomous political groups with respect to one another.

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Although the Chilean government legislates with regard to all reservations as a totality, it deals in most matters under the law with individual reservations, for example when a petition for *división* is made, or with individual persons, such as when credit is sought by

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[62] the Mapuche farmer, or when the Mapuche enters into a relationship
[648] with another individual on a contractual or other legal basis. This
[692] holds, too, in the courts where torts and crimes are adjudicated.

But on the supraindividual level, each reservation has a sense of separateness, underscored by dominant kinship alignments, political organization in the hands of a chief and adult males, territorial distinction, economic resources, sponsorship of religious ceremonials, and so forth. Among these homologous units there exists relative over-all stability. Factors of cultural and political nationalism tend to integrate these otherwise independent units with respect to certain national issues, but this is outside the traditional peacetime political structure, and will be discussed later.

[62] On the one hand there is the supreme political authority of the
[648] Chilean government. This is mediated at the local level through
[692] Indian-affairs officers, courts, and police. On the other hand there is Mapuche customary law enforced by chiefs. The chiefs mediate Chilean law on the reservations. To the extent, however, that the chief's role has been usurped by governmental action, by an effort to break up the reservations and deal individually with the Mapuche as Chilean nationals, chieftainship has been considerably curtailed.

[178] It seems clear that the rise of chieftainship depended on the reserva-
[62] tion system. The Chilean government was at first unable to administer
[648] the segmented Mapuche communities except through numerous agents at the local level. Relationships between Chileans and Mapuche were through the offices of chiefs and the several governmental officials at the provincial level. When the chiefs could no longer monopolize these relationships, largely owing to the growth of divergent economic interests on the reservations and a developing political awareness on the part of the ordinary Indian, their organizational authority began to slip from them. The government abetted this decline by fulfilling many of the services performed by the chiefs. For example, local government officials are entrusted with policing the reservations, building and maintaining schools, improving agriculture, encouraging industry and commerce, repairing roads and other public works, and many other things that formerly fell to the reservation Mapuche under the direction of their chiefs. The national government intentionally established a mechanism for effectively bypassing the power of chiefs. The intention is symbolized in one respect in the various "percentage" clauses in the land-allotment legislation.

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836 through his mother. Without this kinship tie, such negotiation would
848 be taken amiss by the young man on the grounds that he was being
578 unduly coerced and his honor impugned. In most respects, the pri-
558 mary consideration in these matters is family honor, and the danger
of interfamilial hostility and loss of honor are sufficient to make
responsible relatives on both sides attempt to smooth things over. The
[177] notion of honor in this instance might well reflect an influence from
a Chilean system of values.

754 The fear of sorcery is a deterrent to irresponsible behavior in love
836 affairs. The resort to supernatural vengeance by the injured party,
through consultation with a specialist, seems once to have been a
more widespread practice. Nevertheless, despite what might appear a
growing sophistication, the Mapuche continue to concern themselves
a great deal with witchcraft and supernatural elements. They tend,
however, to dissemble certain beliefs in witchcraft, where these de-
part from those held by rural Chileans, for the purpose of avoiding
ridicule. Mapuche and Chilean peasants share a substantial body
of supernatural beliefs, the Chileans criticizing Mapuche concepts of
supernatural agents only with respect to details, not as a body of
beliefs.

[682] It is not surprising to hear sometimes of murder being committed
against a sorceress by one whom she has wronged or threatened. In
681 the past, when the reservations were not too closely surveyed by the
692 national police, the Mapuche tended to settle their disputes according
754 to traditional methods. Wrongs were avenged by witchcraft and mur-
782 der. Included in this pattern was the socially sanctioned killing of
839 adulterers by the injured man and his kingroup. Tangential to this
836 practice was the one of killing unfaithful lovers, especially men who
had forsaken their sweethearts after they became pregnant. It is said
[628] that these killings, like others, resulted in interminable feuding or
the payment of an indemnity which brought the matter to a close.
754 Today, although violent murder occurs now and then, vengeance is
772 usually exacted through witchcraft. Blood feuding is a thing of the
[628] past, most overt acts of vengeance now subsumable under the category
692 of misdemeanors, as defined by Chilean law. Under these circum-
stances fewer relatives on both sides of an issue become directly
involved.

836 There is, however, no clear evidence that love affairs which re-
sulted in one of the parties suffering injustice characteristically led
to violent reprisal and blood feud, at least during the last fifty or

community are not dealt with more harshly. A witch is a terrible person whom no one undertakes to harm without the backing of the entire community.

Within one's own patrilineage the fear of sorcery being practiced for the purpose of murder, illness, or injury is negligible, although one may expect certain animosities to result in the practice of sorcery for the purpose of causing crop damage, loss of animals and other valued objects, and so forth. Actually, I know of no case in which murder-by-witchcraft was charged between members of the same lineage. And one's enemy within the lineage does not practice sorcery himself, as a rule, but engages the services of a *kalku* to inflict the harm. In these cases the sorcerer is usually a person living on a "distant reservation," as the explanation goes, and is difficult or impossible to discover; and one's enemy, if he does not reveal himself, cannot be identified easily. Since one may never be certain of his enemy in such cases, fears tend to subside as one's fortune improves.

The minimum solidarity necessary for the localized lineage to operate in group activities would be greatly endangered should sorcery leading to murder or serious illness be practiced by one member against another. If such a suspicion was apparently confirmed, there would almost certainly be a concerted effort to expel the evildoer. If the intended victim were to murder the alleged sorcerer, the act would be considered as an execution (previously discussed) and sanctioned by the responsible lineage members. But these rules emerge from stories of such happenings in the past, not, to my knowledge, from events in contemporary Mapuche society. In most instances, people would be satisfied with evicting the evildoer; or, in some cases, with an appeal made to the *Juez de Indios* or a criminal court to resolve the matter within the framework of Chilean law.

Accusations of witchcraft do arise within the lineage, but between members of its branches. The members of sublineages—father, sons, and grandsons—are as a rule the most tightly integrated group above the level of elementary family organization. Indeed, these persons might even comprise a *lofche* or an extended-family group. The greatest danger to sublineage solidarity results from land shortage, which affects not so much inheritance (which tends to be equal among a man's sons) as it